–Continued from yesterday—
On the first meeting, or perhaps one of the first meetings, to discuss consolidation with the public, prior to any financial analysis, educational impacts, or alternate scenarios,  GASD board member James Walrath suggested that the board avoid all that discussion and analysis and simply vote to close Bacon that night. Realizing the danger inherent with such a ‘resolution’ with no prior due diligence, the board voted to move to executive session and thereafter the ‘resolution’ for closure was tabled. ( I don’t recall exactly if the resolution was formally introduced hence the hedge on the term. However I do recall questioning the basis for entering into executive session. )  Fuzzy memory aside, the ideology at play was crystal clear. Again, it’s important to note two things: first, the financial analysis or cost/benefit for closing Bacon had unquestionably been established as a negative financial return to the district 2) the potential impacts on education were again largely unknown at this time. But again, like the prior closing, ideology first, financial analysis later. And the expected educational impacts, well, nowhere to be found.

At this point, the closure advocates knew they had opening, given the budget situation, to push consolidation and closure; now they just had to find the financials to support it. Conveniently, they could return to the discredited consultant report to justify the savings claim — although just as demonstrably flawed as when first presented it formed the ‘objective’ basis for the closure– and the claim of minimal educational impact. One of the glaring flaws in the consultant analysis is the failure to include or analyze any ‘what-if’ scenarios given the closure. So any what-ifs that naturally come to mind given the closing of an elementary school –what if the building sat vacant and unsold; what if the class sizes were too large; what if the number of class rooms was too low; what if property values were impacted; what if academic performance drops given larger class sizes; and on, — were not only never considered but positioned as irrelevant to the debate. After all, if your ideology assures you cost savings from consolidation, why question it. Why deal with financial risk and uncertainties and complexity when you know precisely the future with utter clarity?

We all know how the closure vote went but if you now look at the what-ifs, you see that most worked against the district’s financial case for closure, to the extent you consider the board’s reasoning to be ‘financial’, which clearly is anything but. Look at the subsequent district spending and decisions on the very what-ifs that they rejected and ignored in their closure decision: the district has added classrooms; the district has hired teachers to reduce class size and touted the need to do so; the district has seen elementary school performance lagging;  the district has spent money to heat and maintain an empty building; the district has seen an exodus of young families from the district; the district has eroded community support for its programs; and the district has undercut property values not only in the immediate neighborhood but across the board through the domino effects of the closure most notably through its decision to pursue create magnet schools. Each and every point above undermines the business case for closure, at the time considered a ‘what-if’ by its critics and a sheer impossibility by its proponents, and now are well established certainties. But none of that mattered: the closure advocates had their closure and the bulk of the community behind them more strongly than ever convinced of the fiscal responsibility of the board.  Sounds familiar, no?

For local residents near Bacon school, we have endured a shuttered, graffiti laced building that serves as a useful photo-op for our politicians and administrators to rail against graffiti with strong words but when it comes to the deed of ridding the graffiti, nothing is done. What drove many families to locate in this area has now become a stark reminder of why many left and why many seek to leave. Beyond the immediate tangible impacts on my neighbors and my family, the closure catalyzed the movement to magnet school programs as it avoided the difficult choices to be made with redistricting especially with the influx of newly displaced Bacon students. Why redistrict when you can randomly bus children to-and-fro and ultimately, seek a centralized elementary school? Again, the catalyst for this decision centered upon financials and rather than define a policy and strategy for the district to best achieve and optimize educational outcomes with reasoned analysis and thought, the district chose the course solely based upon financials — the one area they consistently get wrong time and again.

On the topic of magnet schools, I think it is fairly clear that the magnet approach is not yielding successful outcomes based upon our test scores, with the notable exception of Barkley, a high performer prior to the magnet school program and since. Is it any surprise then, that at the time of the Bacon closure, a board member considered shuttering Barkley  in addition to, or perhaps instead of, Bacon as a feasible strategy to deal with the budget? Think about that in light of our current test scores and magnet program, you know the academic stuff. Nothing better illustrates the mindset toward governance of our school district than the mission to gut academics if it offers even the faintest glimmer of hope for a financial return. And this is what the community accepts time and again: the false promise of financial gains and tax savings while ignoring the very real loss on academic outcomes and property values.

It is simply Madness.

By this point, I expect to be accused of madness or perhaps a range of emotional and psychological maladies myself  given my revival of the Bacon closure. The prior  accusation may indeed contain elements of truth  but it only serves to distract and misdirect from my larger points:  We are inextricably tied to a district with lackluster educational performance and crushingly high school taxes not because we are merely victims of  economic cycles or forces beyond our control, but I’d argue, we are tied up and twisted by the very decisions and actions of our board and administration and the majority of the community who support them and their policies. I’m sorry if it’s impolite to place fault at the community’s door step but some of it indeed belongs there.

To now look at 300 Guy Park or 40 Henrietta Boulevard as an example of sound governance and financial management is laughable at best and negligence at worst. The rally cries and high fives surrounding the sales reflect a blissful ignorance of the true costs.

In a financial sense, we have sunk costs with the decisions so we have no chance to recoup the losses nor should we try. The Bacon sale is a simple matter: selling the property eliminates the uncertainty surrounding the future use of the building and of all possible uses, the projected use seems most consistent with the neighborhood. It’s no secret that preserving the character of neighborhoods and their attendant property values never appears in the financial calculus of most decisions. That is why 300 Guy Park was sold without blinking an eye even though the current green space would have been  converted to a monstrous parking lot. In my view, removing the uncertainty of the future use adds present value to the surrounding homes. Simple.

And maybe, just maybe, a bit of good karma will finally come our way.

Fin

300 Guy Park Ave (continued)

Let me pick up where I left off on my last post with the salient question of whether the current deal of $135K from Mr. Petrosino represents a good deal for the public in terms of the sale of 300 Guy Park Ave. I’m not so sure.

On the plus side, Mr. Petrosino has a solid track record and based upon his public comments, I respect his candor in critiquing the very board for their less than stellar process in selling the building. That takes some … guts. More importantly, he has expressed a willingness to communicate and compromise in terms of minimizing the impact on green space or put differently, minimizing the paved lot adjacent to the building. Critical points.

What makes me hesitate are three factors: 1) the still deep discount from the listing price with the sale now somewhere around $13 per square foot 2) the uncertain aesthetic of a parking lot in a residential neighborhood 3) the unknown counter-offer from the WPHO

Let me focus on points 1 and 3 as they strike at the heart of the question of protecting the public interest as espoused by the GASD board.  As presented thus far, the public interest is best served by putting something on the tax roll versus not — that is the conventional wisdom or so we’re told. But is it really?

Not necessarily. It is financially possible and perhaps even feasible that the WPHO deal could be better for the public interest. From public and published statements, there appeared to be a willingness for them to pay taxes for a period of time to make their bid competitive. Coupled with perhaps a higher bid, it is a perfectly plausible scenario. I’ll call that the hard-dollar scenario.

But there is also a soft-dollar scenario if you look at the projected uses of the buildings: a 6 unit apartment or a museum. The impacts from each are radically different on the fabric of the neighborhood and I’d argue, the fabric of the city. With a 6-unit, you get negligible economic impacts beyond the tax receipts and the consumer spend of the tenants. If exceptional units, I’d accept that the units may draw people to the city given their locale and amenities. With a museum on the other hand, you would garner some employment and importantly the ability to draw people from outside the area. I’ll admit and accept that the museum is indeed a riskier proposition but you must then likewise accept that the return to the public may be higher than the 6 units.

Unfortunately for us, we have no way of answering the hard-dollar question precisely as I understand that the discussion of the proposals occurred in executive session. I think there is some irony in this if you look at NYS Open Meetings law specifically for this issue vis-a-vis executive sessions (here):

h. the proposed acquisition, sale or lease of real property or the proposed acquisition of securities, or sale or exchange of securities held by such public body, but only when publicity would substantially affect the value thereof.

The irony here is that the board, by previously accepting Mr. Parkes initial offer of $80k, has already substantially impacted the value thereof of 300 Guy Park by signaling to every buyer that the listing price  is wholly irrelevant and they will nearly accept any offer no matter how ridiculously low. The need for executive session to discuss the proposals to not impact the value seems ludicrous at best.

Regardless of that however, we still do not have the hard-dollars on the various proposals — although I’d argue we should as the session should have been public– so we have no way of answering with certainty the hard-dollar question. But I can answer with certainty that the financial reasoning driving the sale of 300 Guy Park looks highly uncertain.

Next up — Bacon School — this post should be , as they say, ‘interesting’ …

With the concurrent  ’sale’ of 300 Guy Park and the former Bacon School, I find myself with quite a bit to blog about. I’m not able to cover all the ground in one post so I will loop back over the next day or so with more posts as time allows.

300 Guy Park Ave

I harp on the board and administration concerning the claims to ‘fiscal responsibility’, ‘tough choices’ and other slogans suggesting that they make decisions based upon their financial knowledge and expertise. Let’s put aside, for a moment, the other fiduciary responsibilities of the board and administration — namely educational — and focus precisely on this claim of financial savvy and know-how.

After all, it’s this claim of fiscal responsibility that justifies all manners of decisions and strategies: from closing Bacon to closing the museum to embracing a magnet school strategy to, I daresay, ending modified sports.  But the board and administration will never admit they are pursuing policy goals regardless of the financials, they always present their decisions as driven by the financials. In all cases, the devil that makes them do it manifests itself as a financial statement.

Rubbish. And I’ll make the case rather quickly.

The board accepted an offer of $80K from Mr. Parkes even though the property had been listed for $325K. The sale price works out to $7 per square foot. Sure the building does need work but $7 per square foot? Or selling the building at a 75% discount from the listing price?

Surely the community at large would push back against such an affront to the public interest of garnering the best price for the property. Not so much: the community passed the referendum for the sale encouraged as always by the local punditry and politicos by the need to get 300 Guy Park on the tax rolls post-haste. Apparently the financial returns for any project do not get measured in dollars but whether something exists on the tax rolls.

As an aside, I voted late on the night of the referendum so my wife and I were likely in the last batch of voters. At the time, I was the 31st voter on the referendum. I was stunned to say the least at such a low turnout especially in the 3rd ward. The point of this story is simply that the community-at-large bears a large measure of responsibility as well.

If we fast-forward from February to July, we now see that 300 Guy Park, the exact same property albeit with less snow and greener grass, is worth much more than $80K. How can that be?  How can any past or present claim or belief in financial savvy by the board be defensible? It simply cannot.

In a matter of months, the financial return increased by 68% on the sale and likely 68% increase in tax revenues over the following years. The former claim of fiscal responsibility looks dubious at best in light of the figures this week. Predictably, the familiar chorus again rises for placing the property on the tax rolls undeterred by their utter lack of credibility from embracing the lesser deal of a few months ago.

But let’s step back a bit more and ask yet again in light of the new figures, is this a good deal for the public now?

…to be continued….

From today’s Recorder (here):

Members of the Greater Amsterdam School Board of Education were all set to close out a sale of a building on Guy Park Avenue this week – until they found out the district doesn’t own the whole property.

I think this presents an interesting challenge as far as the recent vote on the proposition for the sale of 300 Guy Park Ave given the following:

1) The real estate listing did include the lot as included in the property being sold

2) Voters voted were presented with information– now known to be incorrect– that the property included the building plus the adjacent lot

Given the above, I’m curious to know the following:

1) If a proposition gets passed and then the proposition is deemed illegal (you can’t sell someone else’s property), does that render the vote null and void?

2) If the city passes title to school district as suggested in the article, does the school district then have to resubmit the transfer to the buyer via another public vote?

3) Is the school district required to solicit bids for the lot before selling to the same buyer?

4) Is the school district required to relist the property as the first listing misstated the ownership of the property?

I think there are some additional nuances to the questions above generating even more questions so I’ll be interested to see how this plays out.